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CHANGING TERRITORIALITY, FADING SOVEREIGNTY,
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIGENOUS RIGHTS
Austen L. Parrish*
Introduction
For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the international
community resisted the notion of indigenous rights. In recent years, however,
this has changed. The emergence of indigenous rights in international law
finally may be upon us. At the very least, "the language of both international
instruments and certain court decisions has indicated the emergence of a new
era in which the rights of indigenous peoples may enjoy a more meaningful
presence in international law."' And "[a] great flow of contemporary
discussion and debate has made the international public increasingly aware of
the presence of peoples described as indigenous, who appear to exist in every
inhabited region of the globe."2 Despite a past where victories for indigenous
peoples' 3 rights have been few, many scholars are cautiously optimistic for the
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1. Peter Manus, Sovereignty, Self-Determination, andEnvironment-Based Cultures: The
Emerging Voice of Indigenous Peoples in International Law, 23 WIS. INT'L L.J. 553, 556
(2005).
2. PATRICK THORNBERRY, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 12 (2002); see also
Manus, supra note 1, at 555 ("The latter decades of the twentieth century witnessed a steep
growth in global awareness of both the importance and vulnerability of indigenous
peoples .... ).
3. "Indigenous peoples" is used to refer to non-dominant sectors of society "having a
historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed [in a particular
territory, and which] consider themselves distinct from the societies now prevailing [in that
territory]." Justin Desautels-Stein, National Identity and Liberalism in International Law:
Three Models, 31 N.C. J. INT'LL. & COM. REG. 463,496-97 (2005); see also Declaration on the
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future.
4
The current momentum behind the development of indigenous rights leads
to the question: Why now? Many of those who are optimistic attribute the
development to the slow crystallization of international norms friendly to
indigenous peoples that are a natural extension of human rights5 or
environmental justice." Other scholars credit the dedication of indigenous
Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, G.A.
Res. 47/135 UN Doc. AIRES/47/135 (Dec. 18, 1992) (discussing "persons belonging to
minorities").
4. Jeremy Firestone et al., Cultural Diversity, Human Rights, and the Emergence of
Indigenous Peoples in International and Comparative Environmental Law, 20 AM. U. INT'L L.
REv. 219, 221 (2005) (tracing "the fundamental shift in international environmental law relating
to the role of indigenous peoples at the global, regional, and state levels"); Chidi Oguamanam,
Indigenous Peoples and International Law.- The Making of a Regime, 30 QUEEN'S L.J. 348, 350
(2004) (noting that "international legal developments on indigenous people have attained the
age of majority, and there is an identifiable international legal regime on indigenous peoples");
Manus, supra note 1, at 556 (noting "the emergence of a new era in which the rights of
indigenous peoples may enjoy a more meaningful presence in international law"); Siegfried
Wiessner, Joining Control to Authority: The Hardened "Indigenous Norm, "25 YALE J. INT'L
L. 301, 301 (2000) ("Of remarkable resilience, indigenous communities have come back to
claim their rightful place in the arenas of decision making, both domestic and international.").
See generally THORNBERRY, supra note 2 (providing a detailed description and analysis of
international instruments and decisions that relate to indigenous peoples and their rights). Two
earlier seminal articles that began to trace the development of international laws protecting the
rights of indigenous peoples are Russel Lawrence Barsh, Indigenous Peoples: An Emerging
Object ofInternational Law, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 369 (1986), and Raidza Torres, The Rights of
Indigenous Populations: The Emerging International Norm, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 127 (1991).
5. Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global Comparative
andInternationalLegalAnalysis, 12 HARv. HuM. RTs. J. 57, 109 (1999) [hereinafter Wiessner,
Rights and Status] (noting the development and crystallization of indigenous rights into
customary international law); S. James Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous
Peoples: The Move Toward the Multicultural State, 21 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 13, 14-16
(2004) (describing a body of international human rights law protective of indigenous group
concerns) [hereinafter Anaya, InternationalHuman Rights]; see also S. James Anaya, Divergent
Discourses About International Law, Indigenous Peoples, and Rights Over Land and Natural
Resources: Toward A Realist Trend, 16 COLO. J. INT'L ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 237, 237 (2005)
[hereinafter Anaya, Divergent Discourses] (describing arguments for indigenous rights framed
within human rights discourse). See generally S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw 49-72 (2d ed. 2004).
6. Benjamin J. Richardson, Indigenous Peoples, InternationalLaw andSustainability, 10
REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL. L. 1, 1 (2001) (discussing the concept of
"environmental justice" for indigenous peoples); see also Firestone et al., supra note 4
(discussing environmental law and indigenous rights); Lawrence Watters, Indigenous Peoples
and the Environment: Convergence from a Nordic Perspective, 20 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
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populations in national, regional, and international forums to advance and
make others aware of indigenous issues Certainly these observations are
true. But they do not fully explain why international law is starting to
recognize indigenous rights at this particular time in history. Nor do they
explain why indigenous rights were not recognized earlier.
This essay suggests that another phenomenon is partly responsible for
indigenous rights reaching an age of maturity in international law. The essay
proceeds in three parts. First, it explores the role of the territorial nation-state
in international law and why notions of territorial sovereignty have historically
been unfriendly to the rights of indigenous peoples. Second, the essay
describes how territoriality and sovereignty as organizing principles around
which law coalesces are fading, and how non-state actors play an increasingly
prominent role in international law and relations. Third, the essay explains
why changing notions of territorial sovereignty has been a positive
development for the continued growth and recognition of indigenous rights.
As the strength of the classic nation-state wanes, and new non-state actors
emerge with an international voice, no longer is the international system as
blind to indigenous groups. The essay ends with a few observations and
cautious confidence for the future. It suggests that indigenous groups would
be wise to strengthen their alliances, rather than alienate human rights
advocates and environmental groups.
I. Indigenous Peoples and the Territorial Nation-State
For the longest time, the nation-state - defined by its territorial borders -
was privileged in the international legal system. As explained below, this
state-centered focus of international law was historically inhospitable to the
development of indigenous rights.
A. The Territorial State and Classic International Law
Until recently, international law largely focused on state-to-state relations
and the rights and obligations of states. International law in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries - at least as classically conceived as the law of nations -
237,238-40 (2002) (describing links between indigenous groups and environmental rights). See
generally S. James Anaya, Environmentalism, Human Rights, and Indigenous Peoples: A Tale
of Converging and Diverging Interests, 7 BuFF. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2000).
7. ANAYA, supra note 5, at 56-58 (describing the contemporary indigenous rights
movement); Torres, supra note 4, at 151 (ascribing the emergence after 1972 of indigenous
norms to the "increased activity by indigenous advocacy groups").
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did not concern itself with groups and their status or rights! Centralized
statehood, constructed in what is known as the Westphalian mold,9 was the
framework for all political privileges in international law.' ° Only the
sovereign state entered into treaties. Customary international law bound only
the sovereign state." The state was the basic building block upon which the
modem international system, until recently, revolved. 2
This focus on the sovereign, territorial state gave rise to certain assumptions
under international law. State sovereignty implied external independence:
"the rights of the state freely to determine its relations with other states or
other entities without the restraint or control of another state."' 3 Sovereignty
also had an internal component: "the state's right to devise its own
constitutional and political institutions, enact and enforce its own laws, and to
make decisions concerning citizens and residents of the state, without the
interference of another state."' 4 The twinned concepts of external and internal
8. NATAN LERNER, GROUP RIGHTS AND DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 29 (2d
ed. 2003).
9. See generally Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 20
(1948). Perhaps the most well-known early legal theorist of this classic view of state-centered
international law was Vattel, who compared states to individuals. EMERICH DE VATrEL, THE
LAW OF NATIONS (C.G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Inst. of Wash. 1916) (1758). Hobbes also
compared nation-states to individuals as holders of rights. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN
(Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1651).
10. John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept, 97
AM. J. INT'L L. 782, 786-87 (2003) (describing concepts of state sovereignty); Michael
M'Gonigle, Between Globalism and Territoriality: The Emergence of an International
Constitution andthe Challenge ofEcologicalLegitimacy, 15 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 159, 168(2002)
(referring to "[t]he political legitimacy and exclusivity accorded to the organized sovereign state
as the sole subject of international law...."); see also ANAYA, supra note 5, at 19 (citing J.L.
BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 37-
38 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963).
11. The centrality of states in the international legal system is underscored by the structure
of international institutions. Only states are recognized has having standing before the World
Court. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 34, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
T.S. No. 993. And only states may be members of the United Nations. U.N. Charter art. 4,
para. 1.
12. See generally Gregory F. Maggio, Recognizing the Vital Role of Local Communities
in InternationalLegal Instruments by Comparing Biodiversity, 16 UCLAJ. ENvTL. L. &POL'Y
179, 183-84 (1998) (discussing the classical statist approach to international law).
13. Catherine J. Iorns, Indigenous Peoples and Self-Determination: Challenging State
Sovereignty, 24 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 199, 236 (1992) (citing Nkambo Mugerwa, Subjects
oflnternationalLaw, in MANUALOF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 247,253 (Max Sorenson ed.,
1978)).
14. Id.; see also Brad R. Roth, The Enduring Significance of State Sovereignty, 56 FLA. L.
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state sovereignty' 5 thus meant that each state possessed exclusive jurisdiction
within its territory and, in theory, that each state shared a legal equality with
other states, despite economic or military inequities. 6
Underpinning state sovereignty was the related concept of territorial
integrity: territorial borders limited and defined state power. 7 Law and land
were therefore tightly and integrally linked. 8 Power ended at the border; 9
REV. 1017, 1023-27 (2004) (describing different conceptions of sovereignty and noting that in
the international sense sovereignty creates "a presumptive duty [on the part of states] to respect
the outcome of political processes internal to the others"); cf U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7
(providing that "matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state" are
excluded from United Nations' jurisdiction); Corfu Channel (U.K. v. N. Ir. - Alb.), 1949 I.C.J.
4, 35 (Apr. 9, 1949) (rejecting a state's claim of a right of intervention to secure evidence from
the territory of another state, noting that "[b]etween independent States, respect for territorial
sovereignty is an essential foundation of international relations").
15. See generally Judith Resnik& Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning
the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921, 1921-23 (2003)
(distinguishing external and internal sovereignty). The concepts of external and internal
independence are recognized in the United Nations Charter, which provides that states have an
obligation to respect the "territorial integrity or political independence" of other states. U.N.
Charter art. 2, para. 4; Alan James, The Equality of States: Contemporary Manifestations of an
Ancient Doctrine, 18 REV. OF INT'L STUD. 377, 384-85 (1992) (describing nonintervention
principles).
16. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 287 (6th ed. 2003). The
doctrine of equality of states can be traced back to theorists including HOBBES, supra note 9,
at ch. XV, and JEAN BODIN, Six BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH 7-9 (M.J. Tooley trans., Basil
Blackwell 1955) (1576); RUTH DONNER, THE REGULATION OFNATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 4 (2d ed., Transnational Publishers 1994) (1983). Of course, the equality is formal
equality only. David Slater, Geopolitical Imaginations Across the North-South Divide: Issues
ofDifference, Development, and Power, 16 POL. GEOGRAPHY 631 (1997).
17. Stuart Elden, Contingent Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and the Sanctity ofBorders,
26 SAIS REv. 11, 11 (2006) ("Since the end of World War II, the international political system
has been structured around three central tenets: the notion of equal sovereignty of states, internal
competence for domesticjurisdiction, and territorial preservation ofexisting boundaries."); John
Agnew, Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World
Politics, 95 ANNALS ASS'N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 437, 437 (2005) ("Implicit in all claims about
state sovereignty as the quintessential form taken by political authority are associated claims
about distinguishing a strictly bounded territory from an external world and thus fixing the
territorial scope of sovereignty."); see also M'Gonigle, supra note 10, at 160 ("Politically today,
human territoriality is virtually equated with state sovereignty."); John Agnew, The Territorial
Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory, 1 REv. INT'L POL.
ECON. 53, 55 (1994) (describing how the territorial state is the building block of the modem
international political system).
18. Kal Raustiala, The Evolution of Territoriality: International Relations and American
Law (2005), in TERRITORIALITY AND CONFLICT IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION (Miles Kahler
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domestic law applied only within state borders to peoples within the state, 20 as
did constitutional protections.2' So long as a state did not cause harm outside
its territory, international law had little to say about what a state did internally.
Since the 1950s, this state-centric, positivist version of international law has
been tempered. The "Nazi Holocaust prompted a rethinking of the virtually
unlimited discretion states had regarding the treatment of their own citizens"23
and caused the global community to refocus on human rights. After the
second world war, concepts of human dignity and human rights began to
whittle away at the dominant concept of sovereign territorial supremacy.
International human rights law began to "challenge[] traditional notions of
sovereignty by viewing a state's treatment of its citizens as of international
& Barbara F. Walter eds., 2006); see also Mathias Albert, Territoriality and Modernization, in
WORKSHOP: THE CLUSTER OF WATER, ENERGY AND THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT: TOWARDS AN
EXTRA TERRITORIAL CONCEPT FOR THE MIDDLE EAST 3 (2001), available at http://www.uni-
bielefeld.de/soziw/pdf/albert_2.pdf ("The history of the modem system of states is a history
of defining political power in exclusively territorial terms.").
19. This was not always the case. In England, prior to the creation of the monarchial state,
no concept of territorial sovereignty existed. See John Gerard Ruggie, Territoriality and
Beyond: ProblematizingModernityandInternationalRelations, 47 INT'LORG. 139, 150 (1993);
see also M'Gonigle, supra note 10, at 160.
20. For a discussion of the presumption against domestic laws applying extraterritorially
from a U.S. perspective, see Jonathan Turley, "When in Rome ": Multinational Misconduct and
the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U.L. REV. 598 (1990), and William S.
Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L.
85 (1998). See Austen L. Parrish, Trail Smelter Djh Vu: Extraterritoriality, International
Environmental Law, and the Search for Solutions to Canadian-U.S. Transboundary Water
Pollution Disputes, 85 B.U.L. REV. 363, 387-402 (2005) (describing the recent growth in the
extraterritorial application of law in the environmental context).
21. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2506
(2005) ("[T]he protections of the Bill of Rights are not untethered from the territory of the
United States. Rather, they are spatially bound: operative only within the fifty states and other
territories."). See Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction Over
Nonresident Alien Defendants, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1,28-41 (2006) (generally discussing
the limitations of constitutional protections outside territorial boundaries).
22. See generally Louis Henkin, Sibley Lecture (March 1994): Human Rights and State
"Sovereignty," 25 GA. J. INT'L& COMP. L. 31,33 (1995) (noting the shift, at mid-century, from
state values to human values in international law); Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human
Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT'L ORG. 217 (2000)
(considering the reasons why governments construct regimes to enforce human rights).
23. Wiessner, Rights and Status, supra note 5, at 98.
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rather than merely domestic concern."24 As described in Part II, however,
more significant changes were yet to come.
B. Territorial Sovereignty: Not A Friend To Indigenous Peoples
The classic conception of international law - state-centric, positivistic, and
focused on territorial boundaries - rarely was friendly to indigenous peoples.
First, statehood did not correspond with the socio-political and cultural
groupings of indigenous groups.25 The very idea of the nation-state was based
on European models of political and social organization - dramatically
different from how indigenous groups have traditionally organized, through
tribal and kinship ties, with decentralized political structures and overlapping
spheres of territorial control.26 For some, the nation-state concept "granted a
monopoly of legal personality to the European powers." '27
Second, under a positivist view of international law, with the state as the
primary unit, indigenous peoples had few rights.2" Indigenous groups did not
24. Hari M. Osofsky, Learning From Environmental Justice: A New Model for
International Environmental Rights, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 71, 82-83 (2005); see also Winston
P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The Changing Character of Sovereignty in International Law and
International Relations, 43 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 141, 176-77 (2004).
25. See Maivfi Clech Lfim, Making Room for Peoples at the United Nations: Thoughts
Provoked by Indigenous Claims to Self-Determination, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 603, 611-16
(1992); cf Manus, supra note 1, at 555.
Prominent among the various rationales for disregarding or terminating an
indigenous people's territorial rights is the fact that indigenous peoples tend to
live lightly on the land, and thus do not produce through their lifestyles the kind
of evidence of dominion that European-rooted cultures are willing to recognize
as worthy of legal protection.
Id.
26. ANAYA, supra note 5, at 26-28; see THORNBERRY, supra note 2, at 62 ("Through
indigenous lenses, international law can look like a system for the vindication of Eurocentric
State practice .... On such a view, it has done little to salvage indigenous societies and much
to damage them .. "); see also Robert A. Williams, Jr., Learning Not to Live with Eurocentric
Myopia: A Reply to Professor Laurence's "Learning to Live with the Plenary Power of
Congress over the Indian Nations," 30 ARIz. L. REv. 439 (1988) (arguing that a euro-centric
vision of law denied indigenous rights and threatened to exterminate indigenous cultures).
27. Sundhya Pahuja, Comparative Visions of Global Public Order (Part I): The
Postcoloniality of International Law, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 459, 462 (2005) (describing how
international law is Euro-centric) (quoting John Strawson, Book Review, 5 MELB. U. L. REV.
513 (2004) (reviewing CHRISTOPHER WEERAMANTRY, UNIVERSALING INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2004)).
28. JOHN WESTLAKE, CHAPTERS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1894)
(explaining that indigenous peoples have no rights under international law); see Maggio, supra
note 12, at 186 ("Indigenous and other long-term occupant societies and communities would
297
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qualify as nation-states and therefore were "without full rights to group
autonomy or ancestral lands."29  "[N]ot qualifying as states, [indigenous
groups] could not participate in the shaping of international law.",30  In
addition, international law "regar[ed] the cultural survival, territorial integrity,
and self-determining autonomy of indigenous peoples as matters within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the settler state regimes . . . ." Thus, indigenous
peoples became what scholars have characterized as "entrapped peoples" or
"nations within. 32
The confluence of a European-centered and positivist approach burdened,
and often destroyed, the cultural and political life of indigenous groups.
Indeed, "[t]he treatment of indigenous peoples has been so severe that it has
been referred to as 'genocide' and as a 'holocaust.' '33 "While the particular
be unable to seek redress [in international fora] even when their respective national
governments refuse to recognize their legal rights to natural resources .... "); see also Will
Kymlicka, Theorizing Indigenous Rights, 49 U. TORONTO L.J. 281,284 (1999) (describing the
"salt-water thesis" and noting that "internal minorities [were] not defined as separate peoples"
and therefore had no right to self-determination); Oguamanam, supra note 4, at 357 (explaining
that "[b]ecause indigenous peoples were not recognized under international law, there was no
basis upon which they could enter into valid agreements with entities that were so
recognized ... ").
29. ANAYA, supra note 5, at 23-26. Anaya further explains that "[t]o see indigenous
peoples as 'states' would in the end prove all too difficult for Western eyes." Id. at 26.
Admittedly, at times, indigenous groups have domestically been recognized as separate nations
with their own territorial sovereignty - but that was a product of domestic, not international,
law.
30. Id. at 27; cf Iorns, supra note 13, at 239 (noting that "international law ... rejects
arguments made by indigenous peoples that sovereignty is inherent in peoples").
31. Roger A. Williams, Jr., Frontier of Legal Thought III: Encounters on the Frontiers of
International Human Rights Law: Redefining the Terms oflndigenous Peoples' Survival in the
World, 1990 DUKE L.J. 660, 672; see, e.g., Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574
(1823) (upholding superior U.S. title to Indian lands on the basis of discovery).
32. Wiessner, Rights andStatus, supra note 5, at 59 (citing VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD
M. LYTLE, THE NATIONS WITHIN: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY
(1984)); see also Mary Ellen Turpel, Indigenous Peoples 'Rights ofPolitical Participation and
Self-Determination: Recent International Legal Developments and the Continuing Strugglefor
Recognition, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 579, 580 (1992) ("Indigenous peoples are entrapped
peoples- enclaves with distinct cultural, linguistic, political and spiritual attributes surrounded
by the dominant society.... Indigenous peoples are truly 'nations within."').
33. Ions, supra note 13, at 200; see also Marina Hadjioannou, The International Human
Right to Culture: Reclamation of the Cultural Identities of Indigenous Peoples Under
International Law, 8 CHAP. L. REV. 201, 201 (2005) (noting that acts of cultural destruction
have been described as "cultural genocide, ethnocide, and likened to acts of segregation, similar
to apartheid"); W. Michael Reisman, Protecting Indigenous Rights in International
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histories of different indigenous peoples differ, they have in common a history
of conquest by another group and subordination within their present states,
even where they may not numerically be in a minority."34 One scholar has
described it starkly:
[T]he process of colonization has left so-called indigenous peoples
defeated, relegated to minor spaces, reservations, bread-crumbs of
land conceded by the dominant society. Indians were separated
from their sacred land, the land of their ancestors, and from their
burial grounds with which they shared a deeply spiritual bond.
Deprived of traditional environments, they were not only
politically, but economically, culturally, and religiously
dispossessed.35
Certainly, this was true in the United States with Native Americans. The
United States established a trustee relationship over Indian lands,36 designated
Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations,, 37 and proclaimed the plenary
power of Congress to regulate Indian affairs.3" The "government viewed
Adjudication, 89 AM. J. INT'LL. 350,350 (1995) (noting that "[flrom the time that proto-human
bands roamed the wilds,... organized peoples have invaded inhabited territories and tried to
make themselves dominant.... The 'natives,' 'aborigines,' or 'indigenous peoples' were the
ones who were there and lost...."); Dean E. Cycon, When Worlds Collide: Law, Development,
and Indigenous People, 25 NEwENG. L. REv. 761,761 (1991) (describing how the exploration
and development of natural resources had a negative "direct or indirect impact on the lives of
indigenous peoples").
34. Ioins, supra note 13, at 200; see also Wiessner, Rights and Status, supra note 5, at 57
(describing the "history of suffering, actual and cultural genocide, conquest, penetration, and
marginalization endured by indigenous peoples around the world").
35. Wiessner, Rights and Status, supra note 5, at 58-59; see also Torres, supra note 4, at
133 (arguing that "[t]he dynamics of the colonial relationship have left indigenous populations
with four basic needs, namely the need for: (a) cultural protections; (b) recognition of land
claims; (c) recognition of individual, economic, and social (welfare) rights; and (d) political
autonomy."). For a description of how the effects of development negatively impact indigenous
groups, see generally Cycon, supra note 33.
36. ANAYA, supra note 5, at 31 (describing that "the objective of the trustee doctrine was
to wean native peoples from their 'backward' ways and to 'civilize' them"); Angela R. Riley,
Recovering Collectivity: Groups Rights to Intellectual Property in Indigenous Communities, 18
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175,206-07 (2000) (describing the trust obligation); see also Mary
Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of National Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine
Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 1471, 1495-1508 (describing the trust doctrine); CHARLES
WILKINSON ET AL., INDIAN TRIBES AS SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS 51-62 (2d ed. 2004)
(describing the trust doctrine and sovereignty).
37. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 13 (1831).
38. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) (affirming Congress's
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Indians as genetically and culturally inferior to European-Americans and
sought to protect them from, essentially, themselves., 39 The United States was
by no means unique: the relegation of indigenous groups occurred
worldwide.40
That nation-states have resisted recognizing indigenous rights is hardly
surprising. The existence of indigenous groups with their own culture and
traditions challenges the notion of national unity.4' "Several states argue that
their constitutions do not permit the possibility of more than one 'people'
within the national territory.. ." Further, most states are controlled by an
ethnic majority that "is able to exercise cultural hegemony over the rest of the
nation.'1 3  The concept of the territorial nation-state thus by its nature
undermines recognition of indigenous groups" because its purpose, in part, is
plenary authority over tribal relations); see also United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 648
(1977) (affirming the plenary nature of the power of Congress over Indian affairs, but noting
that it is not absolute). See generally Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its
Sources, Scope and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 195 (1984).
39. Jacqueline Hand, Government Corruption and Exploitation of Indigenous Peoples, 3
SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 262, 269 (2005).
40. ANAYA, supra note 5, at 32-33 (describing attempts to "civilize" indigenous peoples
in Britain, Canada, Brazil, Venezuela, and other countries).
41. Benedict Kingsbury, "Indigenous Peoples" In International Law: A Constructivist
Approach to the Asian Controversy, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 414, 424 (1998) ("Not surprisingly,
proponents of 'national' projects in many states have resisted concepts of 'indigenous peoples'
that seem to challenge the unity of the 'nation."'); cf Lawrence Rosenn, The Right to Be
Different: Indigenous Peoples and the Quest for a Unified Theory, 107 YALE L.J. 227, 227
(1997) (noting how "Americans have favored the ideal of unitarian nationhood without
relinquishing their romance of community.... (and the] "tendency to cast issues predominantly
in terms of individual rights rather than of collective rights .... ).
42. Kingsbury, supra note 41, at 424. The main opposition to indigenous claims of self-
determination has been the fear of creating nations with nations. See also Russell Lawrence
Barsh, Indigenous Peoples in the 1990s: From the Object to Subject of International Law?, 7
HARV. HuM. RTs. J. 33 (1994) (addressing the political and legal issues indigenous peoples
faced while pursuing self-determination and the expected struggles in international law in the
1990s).
43. RuDOLFO STAVENHAGEN, ETHNIC CONFLICTS AND THE NATION-STATE 9 (1996)
(describing the ethnocratic state); see also BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES:
REFLECTIONS ON THE UNIQUE SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (1983) (arguing that natural nation-
states do not exist, but rather that the nation must be "imagined").
44. Turpel, supra note 32, at 579-80 (noting that "politically, indigenous claims challenge
a nation state's assertion of complete political and territorial sovereignty") (citing INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES AND THE NATION-STATE: FOURTH WORLD POLITICS IN CANADA, AUSTRALIA AND
NORWAY (Noel Dyck ed., 1985)); see also Richard T. Ford, Law's Territory (A History of
Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REv. 843,844 (1999) ("Territorial jurisdiction produces political and
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to suppress cultural differences and to establish a theoretical unified cultural
identity.45 Traditionally, "non-state institutions ... such as the family, the
ethnic group, the church, the mosque, and the village ... represented...
incidental, backward, and even illegitimate legacies that needed to be
curtailed... ."46 For that reason, nation-building is commonly understood to
require national institutions that subsume smaller territorial groups and local
cultures.47
Even the development of human rights as an independent constraint on state
action did not, at least historically, fully accommodate indigenous peoples'
concerns.4 8 The collective rights of indigenous groups often "go against the
grain of traditional Western rights thought, which is based on the paradigm of
pitting the individual against the state .... ." Although human rights may
social identities. Jurisdictions define the identity of the people that occupy them. The
jurisdictional boundary does more than separate territory; it also separates types of people:
native from foreign, urbanites from country folk, citizen from alien, slave from free.").
45. See David H. Kaplan, Territorial Identities and Geographic Scale, in NESTED
IDENTITIES: NATIONALISM, TERRITORY, AND ScALE 31, 34-35 (Guntram H. Herb & David H.
Kaplan eds., 1999); Shampa Biswas, W(h)ither the Nation-State? National and State Identity
n the Face of Fragmentation and Globalization, 16 GLOBAL SOC'Y 182-85 (2002). As James
Anaya argues, "The major premises of the late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century
positivist school ensured that the law of nations, or international law, would become a
legitimizing force for colonization and empire rather than a liberating one for indigenous
peoples." ANAYA, supra note 5, at 26.
46. Lam, supra note 25, at 614.
47. See generally Paul C. Szasz, The Irresistible Force of Self-Determination Meets the
Impregnable Fortress of Territorial Integrity: A Cautionary Fairy Tale About Clashes in
Kosovo and Elsewhere, 28 GA. J. INT'L& COMP. L. 1 (1999) (describing the tensions between
territorial integrity and self-determination); Joel Richard Paul, Cultural Resistance to Global
Governance, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (2000) (describing how "traditional conception of
sovereignty assumes in part that the nation-state is identified with a particular national culture");
see also Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: One Decade Later, 25 YALE J. INT'L
L. 283, 285 (2000) (explaining how nationalism is misunderstood to have a negative
connotation, and for Western, liberal societies, "[n]ationalism smacks of racism, xenophobia,
and bigotry").
48. See generally Feisal Hussain Naqvi, People's Rights or Victim's Rights: Reexamining
the Conceptualization of Indigenous Rights in International Law, 71 IND. L.J. 673, 707 (1996)
("The international framework of human rights in the years following World War II was, if not
hostile, certainly indifferent to the particular situation of indigenous peoples.").
49. Wiessner, Rights and Status, supra note 5, at 120-21; see also Kingsbury, supra note
41, at 425-26.
A powerful strand of Western liberalism takes the individual as the essential self-
determining or at least freely choosing subject, is mistrustful of group-based
claims extending beyond nondiscrimination, and calls for neutrality of the state
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protect interests "related to a people's culture and historical heritage, 5° "most
human rights advocacy remains staunchly individualistic" and inhospitable to
claims of collectives."1 For indigenous scholars, human rights imposes its own
cultural values and prevents indigenous communities from fully realizing their
collective identity. Human rights regimes largely have been forged out of a
state-centered view of the world. 2 Until recently, indigenous groups that
"wanted something more than, or other than, the protection of their individual
civil and political rights received little support from international law for their
claims."" Change, however, has occurred.
II. Fading Territorial Sovereignty in the Modern Globalized World
In recent years, the salience of the sovereign state, strictly defined by its
territorial borders, has slowly declined. 4 Contrary to the classic positivist
and other social institutions with respect to competing substantive views among
groups as to what is good and how to live.
Id. at 425; cf Hand, supra note 39. For a discussion of the difficulties of accommodating
illiberal tribal culture in a liberal society, see Angela R. Riley, Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95
CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (exploring American Indian tribal sovereignty and liberalism,
and concluding that "internal tribal decisions regarding Indian culture and tradition be left to
Indian tribes, even when those decisions are inapposite to Western liberal ideals").
50. Manus, supra note 1, at 564-65 (noting the limitations of human rights to address
indigenous peoples' concerns); see also THORNBERRY, supra note 2, at 96 (explaining that "it
can easily be assumed that self-determination as a group right goes against the grain of human
rights"); see also Benedict Kingsbury, Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures of
Indigenous Peoples' Claims in International and Comparative Law, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 189, 193 (2001) (noting the "fundamental political debate" as to "whether issues raised by
indigenous peoples can be addressed exclusively within the existing framework of international
human rights law").
51. Rosenn, supra note 41, at 242; Richard Herz, Legal Protectionforlndigenous Cultures:
Sacred Sites and Communal Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 691, 695 (1993) (describing how Western
political philosophy conceives of rights as adhering only to individuals or states).
52. Esther Ann Griswold, State Hegemony Writ Large: International Law and Indigenous
Rights, 19 POLAR: POL. &LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 91,92-93, 98 (1996) (arguing that the
"[d]iscourse on human rights is carried on within the context of the law of nations, even as this
'deference to governmental supremacy' is challenged by international human rights law");
Kymlicka, supra note 28, at 291 (noting a "major controversy concerning indigenous rights -
namely, whether standard human-rights norms apply to indigenous self-government, or whether
it is a form of cultural imperialism to expect indigenous communities to abide by 'Eurocentric'
principles of individual civil and political rights.").
53. Kymlicka, supra note 28, at 283.
54. See generally STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999).
For other well-known books on the topic, see ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES,
THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS
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view of international law, "[s]tates are no longer the sole bearers of rights and
duties in the international sphere, nor are they the sole actors in the
international arena.", 55 Non-state actors are now important in international
relations and law.56 " Domestic interest groups, transnational corporations, and
global networks of NGOs all take part of the new global, political, and social
constellation that defines the age of globalization."" While domestic groups
at one time had no power, now groups of all kinds, 8 are "increasingly
becoming major actors in the emerging global legal order."59 Even non-state
judicial systems appear to be on the rise.60 This is not to say that the state
sovereignty is ending, but rather that the power of non-state actors is
61growing.
(1995), and SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION
(1996).
55. Yishai Blank, Localism in the New Global Legal Order, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 263,265
(2006); see also Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REv.
167, 169-76 (1999).
56. Peter J. Spiro, Nonstate Actors in Global Politics, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 808 (1998)
(reviewing literature describing the recent rise ofnonstate actors in international law); Philippe
Sands, Turtles and Torturers: The Transformation of International Law, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
& POL. 527, 529 (2001) (describing a system in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries where
the "state was the only player, and the need to protect its sovereignty was paramount" and
recent changes to this model).
57. Blank, supra note 55, at 265; see Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye,
Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations, 27 WORLD POL. 39,41 (1974)
(describing the development of networks that drive international policy); see also Paul Schiff
Berman, From InternationalLaw to Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 485,
492-511 (2005) [hereinafter Berman, From International Law] (describing the myriad of non-
state actors that influence international law); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World
Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 1997, at 183, 184-86 (arguing that the state is disaggregating
in part because of transgovernmental networks).
58. See Erik B. Bluemel, Separating Instrumental from Intrinsic Rights: Toward an
Understanding of Indigenous Participation in International Rule-Making, 30 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 55, 57 (2005-2006) (describing the increased participation of groups in global
governance).
59. Blank, supra note 55, at 263 (referring to local governments); see also Gerald E. Frug
& David J. Barron, International Local Government Law, 38 URB. LAW. 1 (2006) (describing
the development of international local government law); Julie Mertus, Considering Nonstate
Actors in the New Millenium: Toward Expanded Participation in Norm Generation and Norm
Application, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 537, 552-56 (2002) (describing the prominence of
nonstate actors in a globalized world).
60. Brynna Connolly, Non-State Justice Systems andthe State: Proposalsfora Recognition
Typology, 38 CONN. L. REv. 239, 239-42 (2005) (examining non-state justice systems for
indigenous groups).
61. A significant amount of scholarship explains why the end of sovereignty is a myth, but
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Concomitant with the growing importance of non-state actors in
international law and relations has been the emergence of "transnational
agreements, institutions, and adjudicatory tribunals . . . reflecting the
corresponding move from international to transnational law."'62 As a result, an
enormous number of international agreements and organizations exist.63
International institutions are now often a source of norms that states previously
supplied.' 4
In part, the changing role of the territorial state in international law can be
attributed to globalization. 5 The permeability of borders and the fluidity of
community affiliations challenge ideas of inviolate nation-state sovereignty.'
As capital, labor, goods and ideas are able to freely move without regard to
borders, the significance of the territorial state declines and is refocused on
private actors.67 In economic terms, "centrist power has moved even further
still recognizes the growing influence in international relations of non-state actors. See, e.g.,
Richard H. Steinberg, Who Is Sovereign?, 40 STAN. J. INT'LL. 329,334-40 (2004) (arguing that
despite changes, the existence of the state system has not ended and criticizing scholars who
argue otherwise).
62. Blank, supra note 55, at 265.
63. For a discussion, see Kal Raustiala, Refining the Limits of International Law, 34 GA.
J. INT'L& COMP. L. 423,423-25 (noting a more portent role of international law and institutions
to constrain state behavior than some attribute to it).
64. Ruti G. Teitel, Humanity's Law: Rule of Law for the New Global Politics, 35 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 355, 363-65 (2002); cf Peter Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs)
Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 649, 667-72 (2002) (explaining that the decentralized nature of
government structures undermines traditional notions of state sovereignty); Kal Raustiala,
Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 401, 412-15 (2000) (discussing role of
international institutions in international law).
65. Kal Raustiala, Rethinking the Sovereigny Debate in International Economic Law, 6 J.
INT'LECON. L. 841,857 (2003) ("It has become commonplace to argue that qualitative changes
in the global economy have weakened the ability of states to pursue autonomous policies - or
have at least markedly raised the costs of doing so."). For a discussion of the legal challenges
that globalization poses for indigenous groups, see Angela R. Riley, Indigenous Peoples and
the Promise of Globalization: An Essay on Rights and Responsibilities, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 155 (2004), and Miles Kahler & David A. Lake, Globalization and Governance, in
GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 1-2 (Miles Kahler & David A. Lake eds., 2003).
66. Berman, From International Law, supra note 57, at 524 (discussing jurisdiction).
67. Saskia Sassen, Territory and Territoriality in the Global Economy, 15 INT'L Soc. 372
(2000); see also Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization ofJurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 311
(2002). Indeed, because of the globalization of capital, the movement of people and goods
across borders, the reach of global corporate activity, the impact of worldwide NGOs, and the
development of literally hundreds of international or transnational tribunals over the past two
decades, "local communities are now far more likely to be affected by activities and entities
with no local presence." Id. at 319. See generally THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AuTHORITY
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from territory - into a new managing elite that exists within, but also above
and beyond, the state." '68
These changes may also be the result of new ways of thinking about
international relations that pay greater attention to actors within states,69 or
emphasize the role of transnational processes 0 and global, transgovernmental
networks.7 Scholars in the 1980s and 1990s, who vigorously attacked the
notion of inviolate nation-state, territorial sovereignty, may also be partly
responsible for the changes.7 At the very least, modem theorists recognize the
diversity of voices in international law and reject the over-simplified concept
of a unitary, territorial state."
III. Cautious Optimism For Indigenous Groups
This essay so far has attempted to briefly sketch the recent changes in
international law and relations where local governments, non-governmental
entities, and domestic interest groups play an ever more important role on the
international stage. The question remains how these changes benefit the
development of indigenous rights.
IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Rodney B. Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002) (analyzing how
financial institutions, multinational corporations, religious terrorists, and organized criminals
erode the power of the State in global governance).
68. M'Gonigle, supra note 10, at 170.
69. See OONA A. HATHAWAY & HAROLD HONGJu KOH, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND POLITICS (2005); Eric A. Posner, International Law and the DisaggregatedState, 32
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 797,798-801 (2005) (describing the difference between a traditional unitary
state model and a theory that disaggregates the state); Paul Schiff Berman, Seeing Beyond the
Limits ofinternational Law, 84 TEx. L. REV. 1265, 1302 (2006) [hereinafter Berman, Seeing
Beyond the Limits] (describing cosmopolitanism and critiquing realist, state-centric visions of
international law).
70. Harold Hongju Koh is the leading proponent of transnational legal process. Harold
Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 181, 183 (1996); Harold
Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599,2645-58 (1997).
71. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 108-27 (2004); Kal Raustiala, The
Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of
International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002).
72. Perhaps the best known is Louis Henkin. Henkin, supra note 22, at 31; see also
KRASNER, supra note 54, at 3-42 (describing and criticizing notions of strict territorial
sovereignty).
73. Berman, Seeing Beyond the Limits, supra note 69, at 1305.
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A. The Growing Voice of Indigenous Groups
Several reasons suggest that the disassembling of the territorial nation-state
and the rise of non-state actors has been, and will continue to be, a positive
development for indigenous groups. First, in a world where non-state actors
have a say in shaping international law, little reason exists for the international
system to exclude indigenous groups. If local governments, NGOs, IFOs, and
a whole host of other groups can influence international law and participate in
global government, then why not indigenous peoples? Indeed, "indigenous
peoples are increasingly viewed as separate from the states they reside in, with
their own voice in the decision-making process."74 "Indigenous groups...
[have] expend[ed] vast amounts of time and resources ... to participate in
[international regimes]."
Second, in a system where territorial borders are more permeable and
territoriality is less constraining, the historical reluctance of states to embrace
the concept of multiple "peoples" within a state's borders declines.
Globalization of labor and capital renders the traditional concept of a nation-
state - with one distinct, if not imagined, culture - to be unattainable.76
Many peoples now live near, or regularly cross borders, and identify
themselves with multiple communities.77 In the modem world, a "wide variety
of community affiliations and social interactions . . . defy territorial
boundaries."78 Said differently, in a post-Westphalian world the nation-state
74. Firestone et al., supra note 4, at 242; see also Bluemel, supra note 58 (describing
indigenous group participation in global governance).
75. Bluemel, supra note 58, at 59; see also Berman, Seeing Beyond the Limits, supra note
69, at 1300 ("Assisted by a global network of NGOs and activists, indigenous movements use
international norms to influence local political or judicial actors."). See generally Sarah
Radcliffe et al., Indigenous People and Political Transnationalism: Globalization from Below
Meets Globalizationfrom Above? (Econ. & Soc. Research Council, Working Paper No. WPTC-
02-05,2002), availableathttp://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working/20papers/WPTC-02-05%
20Radcliffe.pdf (describing how increased global interdependence has given ethnic groups
unprecedented access to enter the political processes of the global system).
76. Saskia Sassen, The State and Globalization: Denationalized Participation, 25 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 1141, 1150-58 (2004).
77. Berman, Seeing Beyond the Limits, supra note 69, at 1303-04 (citing AIHWA ONG,
FLEXIBLE CITIZENSHIP: THE CULTURAL LOGICS OF TRANSNATIONALITY 6 (1990)); see also
Berman, From International Law, supra note 57, at 512 ("As many commentators have
observed, cultural differences no longer can be based on territory because of mass migrations
and transnational culture flows of late capitalism.").
78. Berman, Seeing Beyond the Limits, supra note 69, at 1306 (describing "epistemic
communities, transnational groups who, over time, come to conceive of themselves as bound-up
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is no longer "the perfected form of political organization towards which all
political energy necessarily aspires."79 Given that reality, states are "mov[ing]
from a state-centric model - where dominant cultures impose their cultural
norms and values on non-dominant cultures - to a model [of
multiculturalism]. 8 0 This has borne out in practice with indigenous groups.
As Anaya describes, "[t]he core idea of the right of self-defined indigenous
communities to continue as distinct units of human interaction has taken root
internationally, making any discussion of their assimilation into larger
societies virtually obsolete among social science and legal experts and even
,,81government representatives.
Third, as non-indigenous groups begin to identify themselves not by nation,
but by other affiliations, 2 one should expect the respect for indigenous groups
to increase. In such a world, communities that are already culturally, socially,
or politically cohesive - as indigenous groups are - should have a
comparative advantage. Indeed, indigenous peoples often identify themselves
as a unified community, even where those communities cross distinct political
boundaries.8 3
B. Emerging International Law on Indigenous Rights
Whether a direct causal link exists or not, the changing nature of territorial
sovereignty has been concomitant with the rapid development of international
law on indigenous rights. Several international instruments and decisions now
seek to empower, protect, and even promote indigenous peoples and their
cultures. The most important include:
with others across nation-state borders").
79. L m, supra note 25, at 616.
80. Firestone et al., supra note 4, at 291.
81. S. James Anaya, The Rights ofIndigenous Peoples and InternationalLaw in Historical
and Contemporary Practice, in 1989 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW SYMPOSIUM 191, 219
(1990)); see also Firestone et al., supra note 4, at 242.
82. AKHILGUPTA & JAMES FERGUSON, Beyond "Culture ": Space, Identity, and the Politics
of Difference, in CULTURE, POWER, PLACE: EXPLORATIONS IN CRITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 33,
34 (1997) (noting that it may be impossible for people living on a border to find a unified
cultural identity, and asking "[w]hat is the 'the culture' of farm workers who spend halfa year
in Mexico and half in the United States?"); see also Robin Cohen, Diasporas and the Nation-
State: From Victims to Challengers, 72 INT'L AFF. 507, 517-18 (1996) (arguing that people
increasingly do not identify with their nation-state, but rather identify with others based on
shared opinions, tastes, ethnicities, religions and other interests).
83. Bluemel, supra note 58, at 77. See generally Richard Osburn, Note, Problems and
Solutions Regarding Indigenous Peoples Split by International Borders, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
471 (1999-2000).
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* the United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, which in June 2006 the Human Rights
Council adopted and recommended that the General Assembly
also adopt;"
" the 2005 proposed American Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples; 5 and
" the 1989 ILO Convention No. 169, which entered into force in
1991, and during the 1990s was considered international law's
most concrete manifestation of the growing responsiveness of
indigenous people's demands. 6
Many other international treaties and instruments, drafted in the last ten to
fifteen years, recognize the need to protect indigenous peoples, their lands, and
their cultures." Resolutions adopted at "major U.N. conferences - the 1993
World Conference on Human Rights, the 1994 U.N. Conference on Population
and Development, the World Summit on Social Development of 1995, the
Fourth World Conference on Women of 1995, and the World Conference
84. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report to the General Assembly on the First Session of
the Human Rights Council, 56-58, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/l/L.10 (June 30, 2006). The Draft
Declaration is printed as an Annex to the Report. See id. at 58.
85. Organization of American States, Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, OEA/SERILJV/.Il.95 Doc. 6 (1997), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/
humanrts/instree/indigenousdecI/html (approved by the Inter-Am. C.H.R., Feb. 26, 1997).
86. See Anaya, International Human Rights, supra note 5, at 47; ANAYA, supra note 5, at
59.
87. See, e.g., WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL MANUAL at OD 4.20 (Sept. 1991) (Indigenous
Peoples) (recognizing the need to consider, for Bank-assisted projects, the rights of indigenous
peoples to develop and use lands that they occupy); International Labor Organization [ILO]
Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries,
June 27, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382 (entered into force Sept. 5, 1991) (calling on States to respect
the cultures and traditional lands of indigenous peoples); U.N. Conference on Env't & Dev., Rio
de Janeiro, June 3-14, 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 22, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 15 1/REV. I (June 14, 1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 (stating that "States
should recognize and duly support [indigenous peoples'] identify, culture and interests and
enable their effective participation in the achievement of sustainable development."); Agenda
21, U.N. Conference on Environmental Development, annex 2, ch. 26, at 385, U.N. Doc.
A/Con.F 151/26 Rev. INol. 1 (1993) (containing a chapter "recognizing and strengthening the
role of indigenous peoples and their communities"); Convention on Biological Diversity, June
5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79, 31 I.L.M. 818 (recognizing that indigenous peoples play an
important role in conserving biological diversity). See generally ANAYA, supra note 5,
Appendix, at 293-342.
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Against Racism of 2001 - similarly include provisions"' s that reiterate the
precepts of indigenous rights. Indeed, "the proliferation of domestic and
international declarations... dealing ... with indigenous issues,"89 since the
1980s has been remarkable. So much so that scholars now identify a specific
"international legal regime devoted to indigenous peoples."
90
Not only have international instruments embraced indigenous rights, so too
have international courts, national governments, and legal scholars. In 1985,
the U.N. Human Rights Committee, in the landmark Kitok v. Sweden case,
found that the collective rights of indigenous groups prevailed over the
individual rights of the group's members.9' The Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, in another seminal decision (Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua),
recognized the territorial rights of indigenous people,92 and so too did the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the recent Dann decision.93
Likewise, national governments in the 1990s began to "explicitly recognize[]
indigenous peoples' collective rights to internal decisionmaking,
representation in national decision-making, land, and control of
development. "' As Russell Barsh has argued, "[s]ince 1989, a consensus has
developed [among national governments] that indigenous peoples have distinct
collective rights, such as rights to land and natural resources, cultural integrity,
88. ANAYA, supra note 5, at 67.
89. Torres, supra note 4, at 156.
These declarations include: the Resolutions of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference,
the Declaration of Principles for the Defense of the Indigenous Nations and
Peoples of the Western Hemisphere . . . , Resolutions of the First Congress of
Indian Movements of South Africa, Conclusions and Recommendations
Regarding the Rights of Indigenous People by the Seminar on Human Rights in
the Rural Areas of the Andean Region ... [and many others].
Id. at 156-57.
90. Oguamanam, supra note 4, at 350; Barsh, Indigenous Peoples in the 1990s, supra note
42, at 34 (explaining how "indigenous peoples are gaining recognition of their legal personality
as distinct societies with special collective rights and a distinct role in national and international
decisionmaking").
91. Kitok v. Sweden, Commc'n No. 197/1985, Report of the Human Rights Committee,
U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex VII(G), at 207, U.N. Doc. A/43/40 (1988).
92. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/AwasTingnicase.
html; see also Manus, supra note 1, at 621-32 (discussing the case decisions); Anaya, Divergent
Discourses, supra note 5 (discussing decision).
93. Mary Dann & Carrie Dann v. United States, Case No. 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report
No. 75/02, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 117, doc. 1 rev. 1 (2002), available at http://www.cidh.org/annual
rep/2002eng/USA. 11 140.htm.
94. Barsh, Indigenous Peoples in the 1990s, supra note 42, at 43.
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environmental security, and control over their own development." 95  The
growth of indigenous rights in international law has not gone unnoticed among
scholars. In academia, many have described the advances made in customary
international law as well as in treaty law. 96 Customary international law
specifically focused on indigenous groups, now includes the right of self-
determination, the right to cultural integrity, and the right to participate. 97
Lastly, indigenous groups continue to influence international law and
relations through their participation in national and international forums
specifically designed to address indigenous issues. Most recently, in May
2006, the Fifth Session of the U.N. Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues
was held in New York, while in September 2005, the U.N. held a workshop
on Traditional Knowledge and Indigenous Peoples in Panama City.98 The
U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations also continues to be active.99
The results have been concrete. As just one example, the General Assembly
adopted a resolution for the "Second International Decade of the World's
Indigenous Peoples," which began in January 2005.'Oo This resolution
specifically sought to more actively include indigenous peoples in the design,
implementation, and evaluation of international law, and also sought to
promote the full and effective participation of indigenous peoples in decisions
which directly, or indirectly, could impact their lifestyles, traditional lands, and
cultural integrity.' l
95. Id. at 43; see also Oguamanam, supra note 4, at 373-87 (describing individual country
and regional developments recognizing indigenous rights).
96. Oguamanam, supra note 4, at 398-99.
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98. Press Release, Econ. & Soc. Council, UNForumRecommendsAdoption ofDeclaration
on Indigenous Rights by 61st General Assembly, as Fifth Session Concludes, U.N. Doc.
HR/4898 (May 26, 2006), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/hr4898.
doc.htm; The Technical Workshop on Indigenous Traditional Knowledge, 21-23 September,
2005, Panama, MESSAGE STICK (U.N. Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues), July-Sept.
2005, at 5, available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/MessageStick 3 July
_2005.pdf.
99. See generally ANAYA, supra note 5, at 221-22 (describing developments by the
Working Group).
100. G.A. Res. 59/174, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/174 (Feb. 24, 2005).
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C. Words of Caution
This essay has suggested that recent developments in international law are
positive for indigenous peoples as they become recognized subjects of
international law. Yet this essay ends on a cautious note. Two points are worth
emphasizing.
First, much more thinking needs to be done about how indigenous groups
can meaningfully take advantage of the new international order. Although
much has been written about sovereignty, international scholars are just
starting to explore the changing role of territoriality in international law.
Indigenous rights scholars, for their part, have not focused or written at all (or
least not in any depth) about these broader changes. Most recent scholarship
has been directed to assessing the current status of international law as it
relates to indigenous groups, without seriously analyzing the "why" question.
Theorizing how changes in concepts such as territoriality and sovereignty
affect indigenous groups is important: the changes impact how indigenous
groups should, or can, advance their interests in international fora. The
declining force of territoriality is particularly worth exploring because
"[i]ndigenous peoples, more than other ethnic groups, rely on their connection
to the territory... to reproduce their place-specific cultures." 102
One example immediately comes to mind where thinking about the role of
sovereignty and territoriality impacts indigenous rights. Some indigenous
groups have adopted "the rhetoric ofnationhood... to posit indigenous peoples
as states, or something like states."'0 3 This claim for self-determination asserts
that "indigenous peoples exercised historical sovereignty [over lands], which
was wrongfully taken from them."' '  "Reviving historic sovereignty" thus
attempts to carry "the hope of reversing the consequences of wrong."'0 5 But is
such rhetoric wise? In a world where nation-states fight to cling onto territorial
integrity, embracing territorial sovereignty as a means of advancing indigenous
rights may be a non-starter. It seems odd that indigenous groups would adopt
the very language (i.e., territorial sovereignty) that the international
community has begun to reject as a cornerstone of international law.
102. Lam, supra note 25, at 621.
103. Anaya, Divergent Discourses, supra note 5, at 241.
104. Kymlicka, supra note 28, at 286.
105. Benedict Kingsbury, ReconcilingFive Competing ConceptualStructures oflndigenous
Peoples' Claims in International and Comparative Law, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'LL. & POL. 189,237
(2001); see also Leslie Sturgeon, Constructive Sovereignty for Indigenous Peoples, 6 Cm. J.
INT'L L. 455 (2005) (promoting a new approach to the rights of indigenous peoples based on
"pragmatic" concepts of sovereignty).
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Alternatively, the decline of the strict territorial integrity of states may mean
that states are more receptive to creating nations within nations. This essay
does not provide an answer; both positions seem plausible. But this issue
deserves serious thought. To date, the scholarly indigenous community has
largely overlooked it.
Second, the rise of non-state actors as important players in international law
suggests that indigenous groups need to be careful to cultivate their allies. In
the past, indigenous groups have been particularly effective in advancing
indigenous rights by allying themselves with environmentalists and human
rights activists, human rights NGOs, and others. 1' 6 These alliances were
crafted because of shared goals, if not a "romantic attachment to cultural
diversity and saving indigenous peoples from 'vanishing." ' 7 The strategy
was successful. "At present there is considerable political support among
Western liberals for 'indigenous peoples'. ."..108 Human rights groups and
environmentalists have been strong supporters, and significant forces in
incorporating norms favorable to indigenous groups into international law.
But how strong these alliances will remain is unclear. They may only be
passing alliances of convenience. The support of human rights activists "is
tempered by unresolved concerns about consistency with other liberal
precepts, and these concerns appear quickly in the face of such concrete issues
as relations between group autonomy and individual human rights."'' 9 This
is especially true with the recent push by indigenous groups for the
international community to recognize so-called group rights. Indigenous
groups risk alienating their staunchest supporters if, as some indigenous
scholars suggest, indigenous groups exercising self-determination can abridge
or limit the fundamental human rights of its members."0  Similarly, the
environmentalists' conception of indigenous groups as "passive victims living
at one with nature and beset by unwelcome modernity"'''" is not an accurate
106. Torres, supra note 4, at 153-55 (describing the role of the media in advancing
indigenous rights).
107. Kingsbury, supra note 41, at 440.
108. Id at 426.
109. Id.
110. W. Michael Reisman, Autonomy, Interdependence, and Responsibility, 103 YALE L.J.
401 (1993). As Laurence Rosenn has described it, a "wide range of nations and cultures [are
forced] to address such issues as female circumcision, the capacity of individuals to further
themselves despite conventions of their group, and the right of individuals to leave the religions
of their birth." Laurence Rosenn, The Right to Be Different: Indigenous Peoples and the Quest
for a Unified Theory, 107 YALE L.J. 227, 230-31 (1997) (book review).
111. Id. at 440; see also Manus, supra note 1, at 641 ("Empowerment of indigenous peoples
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characterization of the aspirations of many indigenous groups. To the extent
that indigenous groups embrace goals inconsistent with sustainable
development (perhaps modernity itself), they may quickly lose
environmentalist support. Without the leverage these groups provide,
indigenous groups will have difficulty ensuring that the international
community enforces the newly developing international norms, and indigenous
peoples may once again lose their voice in international law.
Conclusion
In recent years, indigenous rights have begun to reach an age of maturity in
international law. Certainly, the development of indigenous rights can be
attributed to the crystallization of human rights norms and the dedication of
indigenous groups. In addition to these traditional explanations, the
disassembling of the territorial nation-state and the growing voice of non-state
actors in international law is also likely responsible for the development of
indigenous rights. At the very least, traditional forces for suppressing
indigenous rights have been weakened. The changes in the international legal
system and international relations should be a cause for optimism. But
indigenous groups must be careful in their rhetoric and not alienate their most
ardent supporters. Unless careful, indigenous groups may find their new voice
in international law lost.
in resource decision-making brings no guarantee of more equitable or sustainable local
outcomes, as many indigenous peoples have internalized many of the values of industrial
society.").
